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INTRODUCTION
After five years of arduous negotiations among ninety-one countries,
the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN)' entered its
final phase in July 1978. The representatives of seventeen nations marked
this turning point by publishing a Status Report on the negotiations.2 Re-
sponding to the progress reflected in the publication of that report, seven
chiefs of state conferring at the economic summit meeting in Bonn, West
Germany, established a goal of completing the negotiations by the end of
1978.3
Issuance of the Status Report and the Bonn communique marked the
beginning of the end of five years of protracted debate among ninety-one
nations over tariffs, subsidies, customs procedures, government purchasing
practices, and other problems of international trade. Even when the Status
Report was issued, negotiators had yet to reach agreement on many of the
most important issues, including special treatment for developing countries,
lowering barriers to agricultural trade, new procedures for settling interna-
tional trade disputes, completion of a balanced set of technical agreements,
and domestic political acceptance and implementation of the commitments
made by the negotiators. Thus, despite significant achievements, success in
the Tokyo Round was far from assured in the summer of 1978.
The difficulty of reaching agreement on all the issues before the negoti-
ators has been aggravated by adverse economic and political conditions in
many of the participating nations during the course of the negotiations. In-
creased fuel costs contributed to simultaneous inflation and unemployment,
which raised protectionist pressures in many industrialized nations.4 The
governments of some participants, including the United States, held tenu-
ous political majorities. And Japan's huge trade surpluses antagonized her
1. These negotiations will be referred to both as the "Tokyo Round" and as the "MTN."
For background on the Tokyo Round, see Wolff, The US. Mandatefor Trade Negotiations, 16
VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1976).
2. Statement by Several Delegations on Current Status of Tokyo Round Negotiations,
GATT Doc. MTN/INF/33 (July 13, 1978) (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited as Status Report]. This Status Report was sponsored by the United States,
the European Economic Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Ireland, It-
aly, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany), Canada, Japan, Switzerland, New
Zealand, and Austria. Sweden and Norway concurred in the principles set forth in the Status
Report, but did not sponsor the document.
3. Presidents Carter and Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Ministers Andreotti, Callaghan,
Fukuda, Schmidt, and Trudeau attended the conference, which was held July 16-17, 1978.
For a report on the summit meeting, including the text of the joint communiqu6, see N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
4. See Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1977, at 44, col. I (citing examples of protectionist pressures
being exerted in the United States).
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trading partners, many of whom were incurring unprecedented trade defi-
cits.
That the participating nations have stayed at the bargaining table
throughout this period of international economic difficulties is at least
partly attributable to the enormous importance of the negotiations. If suc-
cessful, the Tokyo Round will recast the framework of accepted interna-
tional trading rules and thereby play a pivotal role in refereeing
international competition for markets in the 1980's. On the national level,
success in the Tokyo Round would symbolize the willingness of govern-
ments to resist domestic protectionist pressures and would reestablish a ba-
sis for responding to worldwide economic problems with negotiation rather
than "beggar your neighbor" mercantilism. On the individual level, suc-
cess in the Tokyo Round would affect everyone in one way or another: as
consumers, as workers, or merely as citizens subject to the vagaries of infla-
tion and unemployment.
Issuance of the Status Report and the Bonn commniqu6 in July made
this success more nearly possible. This Article examines where the Tokyo
Round stands in the fall of 1978. The Epilogue will consider developments
as the Article goes to press.
I
A BRIEF BACKGROUND
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)5 is a body of
rules formulated in 1947 to promote and maintain an open international
trading system.6 Unlike some sets of international principles, the GATT
rules have a significant day-to-day influence on government trade policy,
because maintenance of the GATT system serves the self-interest of the
contracting parties and because violators of the GATT rules risk lawful
trade retaliation by other countries. The GATT Secretariat has sponsored
periodic "rounds" of negotiations to promote internationl trade.7 Until re-
5. Openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
The Agreement has been modified in several respects since 1947. The current version is con-
tained in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SE-
LECrED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as GATT, 4 BISD].
6. The GATT rules were to have been one component of a more comprehensive Interna-
tional Trade Organization, which in turn was to have joined with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund to form the pillars of the international economic system after
World War II. When the International Trade Organization collapsed in 1949, principally be-
cause Congress failed to ratify the treaty establishing it, the GATT rules became the nucleus of
a small international organization. For more complete background information about the
GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969).
7. The first round after the formation of the GAT took place in 1949 at Annecy,
France. The second round was held in 1951 at Torquay, England. The third, fourth, and
fifth rounds took place in 1955, 1960-61, and 1962-67 at Geneva, Switzerland. See J. JACKSON,
supra note 6, at 217-19. See also Rehm, Developments in the Law and Institutions of Interna-
19791
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cently, these multilateral negotiations have focused on the reciprocal lower-
ing of tariff barriers.8 But beginning with the Kennedy Round of the mid-
1960's, negotiators recognized that tariffs were less of an obstacle to interna-
tional trade than more subtle "nontariff barriers." 9 These barriers include
Buy National government purchasing policies, 10 exclusionary product
standards or testing practices, 1' and duty assessment methods that artifi-
cially inflate import duties,' 2 all of which were covered inadequately by the
GATT rules in effect at that time. In addition, there was a growing belief
that the GATT rules were outmoded or weak in several important areas:
anticompetitive government subsidies, temporary import restrictions
designed to aid beleaguered domestic industries, agricultural trade, the rela-
tion between export restrictions and access to vital supplies, emergency re-
strictions for improving the balance of payments, and procedures for
settling international trade disputes.' 3
Other developments also indicated that fundamental adjustments were
needed. The European Economic Community (EEC)14 emerged as a chal-
lenger to America's historic leadership in international trade, exercising
strength approximately equal to that of the United States. The less devel-
oped countries used the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) as a forum from which they vigorously promoted their
tional Economic Relations The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 403
(1968).
8. A typical round of tariff negotiations may require each participant to analyze the po-
tential effects of reducing duty rates on several thousand products. Participants would have to
weigh alternatives such as whether an American offer to reduce the duty rate from 10% to 6%
on $500 million worth of imported red wine (primarily benefiting France but secoxtdarily aid-
ing Spain) would be sufficiently compensated for by a Spanish offer to reduce from 13% to 10%
the duty rate on $900 million worth of imported industrial chemicals (which Sweden and Ja-
pan also export to Spain). In other words, is the potential benefit to the American economy
from increased chemical exports sufficient to offset the potential disadvantage to U.S.
winemakers from increased foreign competition?
9. See, e.g., Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating NontariffiDislortions to Trade, 7 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327, 328 (1975). In addition to a general tariff reduction averaging 35%, the
Kennedy Round produced two agreements on nontariff subjects: an antidumping code and an
agreement on the American Selling Price method of customs valuation. Under the American
Selling Price system, imported products such as benzenoid chemicals and rubber footwear are
valued at the level of their domestically produced competition for purposes of U.S. import
duties. The United States failed to implement the American Selling Price Agreement and did
not change its legislation or practices in response to the antidumping code. See R. BALDWIN,
NoNTAR FF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAE 134-36 (1970). The consistency of U.S.
antidumping practices with the antidumping code remains a controversial subject. See Long,
United States Law and the International Anti-dumping Code, 3 INT'L LAW. 464 (1969).
10. See, e.g., Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10c (1976). See also notes 47-49 infra
and accompanying text.
11. See notes 50-53 ifra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 54-58 infra and accompanying text.
13. See generally Roschke, The GA7T: Problems and Prospects, 12 J. INT"L L. & ECON. 85
(1977); Hudec, GAIT or GABB: The Future Design ofthe General Agreement on Tarifs and
2rade, 80 YALE L.J 1299 (1971).
14. The EEC was created by the Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. I1.
[Vol. 12:1
TOKYO ROUND TR4DE NEGOTIATIONS
trading interests.15 Some of these conflicted with basic tenets of the GATT
system, such as the most favored nation principle-all trading nations
should be treated equally regardless of their relative economic strengths. 16
Coupled with the fear that the GATT might be abandoned as were fixed
exchange rates in 1971,17 these factors led foreign ministers from nearly one
hundred nations, meeting in Tokyo in September 1973, to initiate negotia-
tions to "cover tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other measures which impede
or distort international trade in both industrial and agricultural products
"18
This 'Tokyo Declaration" gave the Tokyo Round its name and estab-
lished its terms of reference. It also called for "improvements in the inter-
national framework for the conduct of world trade ' 19 and, in a marked
departure from past GATT practice, recognized the need to adopt "differ-
ential measures" in order to give developing countries "special and more
favourable treatment. . . in areas of the negotiation where this is feasible
and appropriate." 20 The Tokyo Declaration also made indirect reference
to the need, based on past experience, for assurances that the United States
would implement its international commitments. 21 Although congres-
sional delegation to the Executive of authority to negotiate and implement
tariff reductions has historically assured U.S. implementation of tariff
agreements, implementation of nontariff trade agreements has been consid-
ered more problematic, since they may require significant amendments of
federal and perhaps even state laws.
The Trade Act of 19742 establishes the legislative framework for U.S.
participation in the Tokyo Round.23 In the Act, Congress tried to establish
negotiating credibility while simultaneously preserving its legislative power
over foreign commerce by creating special "fast-track" procedures for ap-
proving and implementing nontariff agreements.2 The President is to con-
clude agreements regarding nontariff barriers and other distortions of
15. For a full report on the 1964 UNCTAD Conference, see United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development Proc., 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CONF.46/139 (1964).
16. The most favored nation principle is embodied in article I of the GATT, 4 BISD at 2.
See note 92 infra and accompanying text. See generally K. DAM, THE GATT 18-19 (1970).
17. See A. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 128-31 (1977).
18. Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, para. 5, reprinted
in BISD (20th Supp.) 19, 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Ministers].
19. Id. para. 9, BISD (20th Supp.) at 22.
20. Id. para. 5, BISD (20th.Supp.) at 21.
21. Id. para. 1, BISD (20th Supp.) at 20. See note 6 supra.
22. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 19 U.S.C.).
23. Section 101 of the Act authorizes the President to proclaim tariff reductions of up to
60% for U.S. duty rates that exceed 5% and of up to 100% for duty rates of 5% or less. 19
U.S.C. § 2111 (1976). For a comprehensive, section by section analysis of the Act, see Camp-
bell, The Foreign Trade Aspects of the Trade Act of1974 (Part 1), 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 325
(1976); Campbell, The Foreign Trade Aspects of the Trade Act of 1974 (Part 11), 33 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 639 (1976).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1976).
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international trade, consulting Congress regularly as the negotiations pro-
ceed. 25 He must then submit the completed agreements and any imple-
menting legislation to Congress, where they will be considered under
expedited bills procedures both in committee and on the floor of each
house.26 Although this procedure is designed to assure U.S. trading part-
ners, to the greatest extent possible, that Congress will implement the agree-
ments negotiated by the Executive, some MTN participants still doubt U.S.
willingness to implement faithfully all nontariff agreements. Several na-
tions have indicated that they will not carry out their commitments or re-
gard the Tokyo Round as complete until Congress has accepted the
agreements and enacted satisfactory implementing legislation.
The Trade Act specified other U.S. negotiating objectives,2 7 including
the longstanding but difficult goal of revising the GATT articles governing
"border adjustments for internal taxes to redress the disadvantage to coun-
tries relying primarily on direct rather than indirect taxes .... -28 GATT
rules currently permit "indirect" taxes, such as sales, excise, and value-
added taxes, to be excused or rebated for products that are exported. But
the rules deny such favorable treatment to "direct" taxes, such as income
taxes.29 Congress believed that this double standard conferred an unfair
25. Id § 2112(a).
26. Under the expedited bills procedures, the implementing bills are to be discharged au-
tomatically from committee 45 legislative days after their submission, if they have not been
reported earlier, and are to be voted on by the full House of Representatives and Senate,
without amendment, 15 legislative days after they are reported or discharged from committee.
The Senate has an additional 30 working days in which to consider revenue bills, such as those
amending U.S. tax or tariff procedures. These procedures are intended to ensure that
nontariff agreements and their implementing legislation will be acceptable to the Congress
before they are submitted, and that once they are submitted, Congress will accept or reject
them promptly. Id. § 2191.
27. These additional negotiating aims include: (1) revision of the international rules gov-
erning use of "safeguards" to restrict imports and thereby permit domestic industries to adjust
to growing competition from foreign industries, id. § 2117; see notes 78-91 infra and accompa-
nying text; (2) negotiation of the MTN agreements on a sector by sector basis, id. § 2113(b); see
notes 107-28 infra and accompanying text; (3) conclusion of mutually beneficial agreements
with developing countries, id. § 2116; see notes 131-32 infra and accompanying text; and (4)
negotiation of agreements assuring the United States access to vital supplies, id. § 2118. One
special section of the Trade Act dealt with revision of the GATT framework of international
trading rules and established several goals, such as introduction of trade-weighted voting,
adoption of international fair labor standards, and introduction of provisions on access to vital
supplies. Id. § 2131 (1976). To ensure that negotiators heard a broad segment of U.S. view-
points, the Act also established a large network of private sector advisory committees repre-
senting industry, labor, commerce, and the general public, id. § 2155, and provided that
designated members of the House Ways and Means Committee and. Senate Finance Commit-
tee were to be formally accredited to the U.S. negotiating delegation, id. § 2211.
28. Id. § 213 1(a)(5).
29. The purpose of allowing remission of indirect taxes imposed by the exporting country
is to avoid double taxation, since it is presumed that indirect taxes are shifted forward to the
consumer, and that similar taxes are imposed by the importing country. Direct taxes do not
receive the same treatment because of the assumption that these taxes are shifted backward to
the producer, rather than being passed on to the consumer when the goods are exported.
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trading advantage on countries that rely heavily upon indirect taxes.
The Tokyo Declaration of September 1973 had called for the MTN to
conclude in 1975.30 No attempt was made to begin negotiations, however,
until Congress enacted the Trade Act at the beginning of 1975. Shortly
thereafter, the Trade Negotiations Committee-the MTN parent
body-established separate negotiating committees to consider tariffs,
nontariff matters,31 safeguards, agricultural trade, tropical products (those
from developing countries), and sector-by-sector negotiations. In addition,
negotiations on government purchasing practices that had been underway
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
were formally incorporated into the MTN. Finally, the Committee began
negotiations to reform the framework of the GATT international trading
system. These framework negotiations covered new provisions for settle-
ment of disputes, access to vital supplies, emergency trade restrictions, and
special treatment for developing countries.
The negotiations failed to move forward significantly until after the
change of U.S. administrations in January 1977. Prior to this, the negotia-
tions had languished because of the international economic recession and
the perception of other governments that the Ford Administration lacked
the congressional support necessary to implement nontariff agreements and
the popular support necessary to win reelection. These foreign perceptions
prevented the United States from exercising strong leadership in the negoti-
ations prior to 1977 and caused other countries to mark time awaiting the
results of the U.S. election. The MTN only developed momentum when
the new Administration's negotiators, headed by Ambassador Robert
Strauss, gained a commitment from the EEC to a series of deadlines ex-
tending from August 1977 through July 1978.32 By December 15, 1977,
negotiators were to work out a general mathematical formula, or hypothe-
sis, for industrial tariff reductions,33 initial texts of agreements on specific
nontariff matters, and procedures for negotiating reductions of agricultural
tariffs.34 The participants were then to produce a comprehensive general
Since the goods are in effect not taxed at all by direct taxes, no double taxation results.
Rosendahl, Border Tax Adjustment:ProblemsandProposals, 2 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85,90
(1970); Marks & Malmgren, supra note 9, at 351-55.
30. Declaration of Ministers, supra note 18, at para. 11, BISD (20th Supp.) at 22.
31. Subgroups were to consider quantitative restrictions on import quotas, customs mat-
ters, and product standards.
32. Other important MTN participants tacitly accepted this commitment made by the
EEC nations.
33. Tariff negotiators first agree upon a hypothesis or mathematical formula by which all
tariffs are, at least hypothetically, to be reduced. They then bargain over possible exceptions
to or modifications of the formula with respect to specific products. See J. JACKSON, supra
note 6, at 223-29. For an analysis of the specific alternative formulas considered at the Tokyo
Round, see W. CLINE, N. KAWANABE, T. KRONSJO & T. WILLIAMS, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN
THE TOKYO ROUND 67-75 (1978).
34. Negotiators agreed during the summer of 1977 that agricultural products would not be
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agreement by mid-January 1978 and conclude the bargaining by July 15,
1978.
Although the first of these goals was substantially met, the other two
proved harder to attain. January produced consensus among only a few
developed nations and at a very general level. As 1978 went on, the July 15
date assumed a pivotal importance, at least among U.S. officials. But the
goal for that date changed in subtle but significant ways: July 15 became
less a target date for final completion of the MTN and more a deadline for
political level agreement on all major elements of the negotiations, to be
followed by a period for completing details.
That the MTN did not conclude by July 15 was largely due to the sheer
complexity of the subjects under negotiation and the intractability of cer-
tain issues.35 In the end, delegations from major developed countries
drafted a Status Report on the current status of the negotiations for submis-
sion to the heads of state who were to confer at the Bonn economic summit
meeting. In addition to discussing areas of progress, the Report notes some
of the Tokyo Round's unresolved issues and skirts others. Although the
developing countries have not accepted it, the Report serves as a useful
focal point for analyzing the present status of the MTN.
II
PRESENT STATUS OF THE TOKYO ROUND:
SPECIFIC ISSUES
The July 13 Status Report was in fact a definition of the scope and
unresolved issues of the MTN rather than a draft final agreement. When
the negotiators returned to the bargaining tables in September, their task
was complicated by the tangled relationships among the subjects of discus-
sion and the delicate balance of the negotiating package as a whole. For
example, agricultural issues permeated many negotiating areas, including
tariffs, subsidies, countervailing duties, and product standards. Partici-
pants were also considering all aspects of trade in steel-tariffs, government
purchasing practices, subsidies-together as well as in subgroups that deal
with each of these aspects. Discussion of the proposal to eliminate the U.S.
nontariff barrier known as the American Selling Price system of customs
valuation affects both the customs and the tariff negotiations, because aban-
donment of the system would involve changes in duty rates for the products
included among those subject to the general tariff formula, but would instead be negotiated
when participating governments extended specific requests for tariff reductions to which other
governments would respond.
35. These issues included market access for agricultural products, domestic subsidies that
distort trade competition, use of selective temporary safeguard actions to limit imports from
one nation only, and special treatment for developing countries.
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to which it currently applies. Further, the issue of special treatment for
developing countries arises in virtually all areas of the negotiations.
This mutual dependence of MTN subjects not only renders them diffi-
cult to comprehend and manage but also underscores the fact that the final
MTN agreement must be carefully structured so that, as a whole, it accom-
modates the domestic political interests of the participating nations. The
MTN results must, after all, be politically acceptable in the home countries
or else the negotiations will have been little more than an academic exercise
for the participants. The following discussion will attempt to explain the
status of the issues before the negotiators and describe their interrelation-
ships and influences on the effort to achieve the elusive multilateral political
balance.
A. INDUSTRIAL TARIFFS
The success of prior multilateral negotiating rounds has substantially
lessened the importance of periodic negotiated reductions in tariff rates.
The average incidence of industrial tariffs is already relatively low in most
industrialized countries 6 In addition, the effect of negotiated tariff reduc-
tions on domestic industries is diminished by the fact that they are phased
in over a period of years.37 Thus, in actual practice, a tariff reduction of
40% applied to a 10% duty rate would achieve a net reduction of 4 percent-
age points over two to four years to a 6% duty rate-hardly a dramatic
action. Nevertheless, many observers will utilize the average reduction of
industrial tariffs that emerges from the MTN as a means to measure the
Tokyo Round's success, because tariff reductions are a traditional focus of
trade negotiations and because such reductions are readily identifiable and
quantifiable.
The most effective way to negotiate tariff rate reductions for thousands
of individual products from many countries is for the participants to adopt
a general hypothesis or formula, specifying the percentage by which all tar-
iffs are to be reduced, and then to bargain about particular products that are
to be exempted from the general reduction or subjected to higher or lower
duty reductions than those called for by the formula. In November 1977,
the principal MTN participants agreed to adopt the "Swiss formula," a
compromise that set an average overall tariff reduction of thirty-five to forty
percent. This formula also attempted to reduce higher tariffs by a greater
amount than lower ones, in order to accomplish "tariff harmonization."
At the same time, the major participants also agreed that the politically
36. W. CLINE, N. KAWANABE, T. KRONSjO & T. WILLiAMS, supra note 33, at 10.
37. The Trade Act requires that duty rate reductions made pursuant to trade agreements
be phased in at not more than three percentage points per year, or one-tenth of the total reduc-
tion called for by the agreement, whichever is larger. All such "staging" must be completed
within 10 years following the initial reduction. 19 U.S.C. § 2119 (1976).
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sensitive subject of agricultural tariff reductions would not be negotiated by
applying the general formula. Rather, each interested country would ad-
vance specific requests for duty reductions, and the countries to which the
requests were directed would respond by making specific offers. This cru-
cial compromise made possible the agreement on a tariff formula and ena-
bled the MTN to move forward. In addition, the negotiating parties
determined that the agreed-upon tariff reductions would be phased in over
eight years and that a review after five years would determine whether ex-
ternal economic conditions warranted continuance of the reductions. Al-
though this "conditionality" factor was vital to acceptance of the formula
by the EEC nations, its real importance is probably limited in view of the
relatively minor tariff reductions involved.
In January 1978, the United States and several other countries
presented comprehensive tariff offers specifying the products they were will-
ing to subject to the tariff formula and other tariff changes they were pre-
pared to make.38 Bargaining then began over possible amendments as
negotiators sought to gain additional access to other nations' markets in
return for opening their own domestic markets to foreign exporters. The
principal U.S. goals during this bargaining were: to gain improvement in
the offers of several trading partners, most notably Japan and the EEC; to
minimize reductions in the initial offers made by the United States and
other nations, which could quickly erode the amount of the general tariff
reduction; and to achieve substantial reductions in foreign tariffs on goods
exported by U.S. industries.39 Improvement of foreign nations' tariff re-
duction offers, the first goal, was hampered by differing interpretations of
the value of the offers.4° Correlatively, domestic political pressures
strained the ability of the United States to maintain its original offers to
exempt some products, especially textiles,41 from any tariff reductions. 42
38. Participants who made offers on January 23, 1978 included the United States, the
EEC, Canada, Japan, the Nordic nations (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland) jointly, and
Switzerland. Australia subsequently advanced offers. South Africa, New Zealand, and sev-
eral developing countries subsequently indicated that, although they would not make compre-
hensive offers, they would be willing to negotiate on an item-by-item basis. See U.S.
Delegation to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Background Notes: Tariffs (July 10, 1978)
(public document prepared for the press) (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal).
39. Affected U.S. exports include paper, computers, office machines, scientific instruments,
and chemicals.
40. For example, on items in which it had no export interest, should the EEC give credit to
the United States for "greater than formula" offers-offers to reduce tariffs on particular prod-
ucts by more than the 40% reduction achieved by application of the Swiss formula?
41. At this writing, a rider to the Export-Import Bank Appropriation Bill that would re-
quire the exclusion of textiles from tariff reductions is under consideration in a House-Senate
conference committee, having been adopted by the Senate.
42. The Trade Act requires that articles subject to outstanding escape clause import relief
actions or national security actions be withheld from trade negotiations. 19 U.S.C. § 2137
(1976). At present, this affects principally petroleum products (national security), specialty
steel, televisions, shoes, and citizens band radios (escape clause).
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The third U.S. objective, achievement of substantial tariff reductions in
product sectors of particular interest to U.S. exporters, was still the subject
of extensive negotiation at the end of the summer.
The July 13 Status Report announced that the goal of the MTN was to
achieve substantial liberalization compared with the Kennedy Round.
This statement suggests that a general tariff reduction will be considered a
success if it falls within the same range as, but does not necessarily equal or
exceed, the thirty-five percent decrease achieved by the Kennedy Round.
The Status Report also appears to acknowledge that precise reciprocity is
not possible and that countries which give up more than they receive in the
tariff negotiations may have to seek offsetting concessions in another part of
the MTN. The Report only thinly veils the inability of the United States to
achieve all of its objectives in the sectoral negotiations. The Report adds
that a high level of "binding of duties" by all participants is an important
objective, referring to the fact that many nations apply duty rates that are
not "bound" or guaranteed in the GATT, with the result that they can raise
the rates at will without incurring any penalty under the GATT.
The Status Report assures developing countries that the final MTN
tariff offers will contain measures of special and differential treatment for
developing countries, but adds that developed countries expect adequate
contributions from developing countries commensurate with their state of
development. This special treatment almost certainly will not involve ap-
plication of lower duty rates to products of developing countries than to
products from developed countries, since this would be contrary to the most
favored nation principle underlying the international trading system.43
Rather, nations will probably be able either to apply reductions greater
than those set by the formula to products of particular export interest for
developing countries or to phase in tariff cuts on such products more rap-
idly than other reductions.44
43. The Generalized System of Preferences is an existing international program under
which developed countries grant more favorable tariff treatment to selected products imported
from developing countries than to the same products when imported from other developed
countries. Although the GATT Contracting Parties adopted a temporary 10 year waiver to
give the Generalized System of Preferences international recognition, the system has not yet
been adopted as a permanent part of the international trading system. See generally Graham,
The US. Generalized System of Preferencesfor Developing Countries: International Innovation
and theArt of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INV"L L. 513 (1978); Nemmers & Rowland, The U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences: Too Much System, Too Little Preference 9 LAW & Pol'Y
INT'L BUS. 855 (1977).
44. These possiblities were discussed during the early years of the MTN in the negotiating
group on "tropical products"--products of less developed countries. That group has now
virtually disbanded and its efforts have been incorporated into the larger tariff negotiations.
Developed countries disagreed over what constituted appropriate contributions to the tropical
products negotiations. A number of the developed countries made minor improvements to
their generalized systems of preference as their entire contribution. Only the United States
insisted on some measure of reciprocal concessions from the developing countries on the
ground that they had to be prepared to accept progressively greater responsibilities in the inter-
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B. NONTARIFF MATTERS
Congress must, of course, approve the results of the nontariff negotia-
tions45 and in most cases implement them by legislation.46 In addition to
its effect upon practices of the federal government, this legislation may af-
fect some actions of state and local governments, such as the purchasing of
goods for government use or the legislation of product standards.
1. Government Procurement
Government agencies buy for their own use everything from spacecraft
to paper clips. Nations reserve most of these markets for domestic produc-
ers through various techniques, including the establishment of formal
"margins of preference" such as the federal Buy American Act,47 exclusion
of foreign bidders from eligibility lists, failure to advertise contracts or so-
licit bids, and the award of contracts without disclosing the criteria on
which the award is based. Because they limit the access of foreign manu-
facturers to domestic markets, these practices constitute significant nontariff
barriers to international trade. The present GATT rules do not expressly
cover government procurement practices except by exempting preferences
for domestic manufacturers from the "national treatment" principle. That
principle requires nondiscrimination in the conditions of sale applied to do-
mestic and foreign products.48
An international agreement cannot seriously be expected to eliminate
all preferences for domestic goods from government purchasing policies.
An agreement could, however, explicitly require fairness and openness in
the use of domestic preferences. Express margins of preference would be
tolerable if applied in accordance with reasonable procedures. Under such
a system, the formal margin of preference would protect domestic manufac-
turers to a limited extent, just like a tariff, yet also permit foreign suppliers
national trading system in return for any special treatment that they were to receive. Follow-
ing this approach, the United States concluded minor trade agreements with Mexico on
December 2, 1977 and with India on July 26, 1978, which called for a reciprocal exchange of
concessions. These agreements have not yet been implemented.
45. The presentation of subjects in this article follows the author's concept of a logical
organization, rather than the more generally accepted one, which would, for example, catego-
rize the negotiations on subsidies and countervailing duties under "nontariff measures" rather
than under "reform of the trading system" as is done here, see notes 65-77 infra and accompa-
nying text.
46. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
47. 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10c (1976). Such margins of preference may be fixed in terms of
percentage amounts. For example, the regulations that implement the federal Buy American
Act establish a six percent margin of preference: foreign goods may be used when their cost is
less than 94% of the cost of comparable domestic goods. 41 C.F.R. § 1-18.603-1 (1977).
48. Article III of the GATT embodies the national treatment principle and article III(8)(b)
exempts government purchasing, 4 BISD at 7.
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to compete in the same market despite the preference for goods manufac-
tured domestically.
Negotiations aimed at drafting an international government procure-
ment code began several years ago in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The draft agreement produced by
these negotiations as well as the issues still under discussion were trans-
ferred to the MTN in 1976. A major unresolved issue in these negotiations
concerns which government agencies and activities would be covered by
any final agreement. Defense contracts that involve national security will
not be covered, but the treatment of quasi-governmental bodies such as
transportation and communication facilities and publicly owned utilities re-
mains unsettled. Of course, national viewpoints tend to reflect the degree
of government ownership of such entities in MTN participant countries.
Although the Status Report's general language indicates significant disa-
greement, the Report's sponsors agreed that "developing country adherents
will not offer full coverage at this time, but. . . their coverage will be ex-
panded as their economic development needs allow."49
2 Technical Barriers to Trade: Standards
A U.S. antipollution standard could be written in technical terms that
would effectively exclude Japanese automobiles from the U.S. market.
The EEC could require American-made radios to be certified by an EEC
authority as conforming to EEC electrical safety standards and then refuse
to certify the U.S. products. Japan could reject the results of foreign safety
tests of gas stoves and subject U.S. stoves to more stringent or expensive
tests than those applied to comparable Japanese products. Canada could
require labeling of California wine as "Ersatz Burgundy from California,"
ostensibly to prevent deception of consumers. These imaginary examples
illustrate how nations may use product standards, testing, and certification
as nontariff trade barriers. In reality, it is much more difficult to distin-
guish between illegitimate exclusion of imports and legitimate regulation
protecting health, safety, the consumer, or the environment. The GATT
does not assist this effort, since it does not deal with the effect of standards
practices upon international sales of goods.
A GATT working party developed a draft code of conduct for prevent-
ing technical barriers to trade (standards code) in 1973, prior to the com-
mencement of the MTN.50 This draft has formed the basis of the MTN
standards negotiations, which have moved slowly because of several inher-
ent difficulties. First, it is hard to separate overly restrictive applications of
product standards from cases in which they are applied fairly to accomplish
49. See Status Report, supra note 2, at 2.
50. See Groetzinger, The New GAYT Code and the International Harmonization of Prod-
ucts Standards, 8 CORNELL INf'L LJ. 168, 183-88 (1975).
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their proper purpose. Second, the appearance of ceding some degree of
national sovereignty over issues as politically sensitive as health or safety
regulations creates popular suspicion of international standards agree-
ments. Third, the draft code would apply to unduly restrictive applications
of product standards by state and municipal governments as well as by pri-
vate organizations, thereby creating political and perhaps constitutional
problems for national governments in federal systems.5' Finally, because
the EEC is still in the process of harmonizing its internal standards prac-
tices, Europeans are concerned about how the draft code would affect ex-
isting EEC practice.
Negotiators have addressed these politically charged problems by de-
veloping a wholly procedural agreement. Rather than dictate substantive
standards, the draft code would disapprove the use of standards, testing,
and certification to obstruct international trade. In addition, it advocates
use of notice and comment procedures for adopting proposed regulations,
promotion of international standardization, and use of foreign testing and
certification whenever feasible. The code also calls for the provision of
technical assistance to developing countries to help them establish stand-
ards and suggests procedures for dealing with complaints of code violations.
Two major issues remain unsettled. The first concerns the nature of
the obligations undertaken by federal governments with respect to state and
local governments and private entities. The draft code proposes that central
governments use all reasonable means within their power to ensure that
nonfederal entities comply with the code's requirements. To establish a
violation of the code by a nonfederal entity, the complaining government
would thus have to show not only noncompliance with the code's require-
ments but also that the central government had failed to use all reasonable
means to secure compliance. By including the latter requirement, the
code's drafters intended to establish international discipline over
nonfederal entities while reconciling the legal and political needs of signa-
tories with federal forms of government.52 Renegotiation of this issue be-
gan in early 1978, however, when several MTN participants with highly
centralized governments suggested that this "best efforts" obligation was
not strong enough.
The second major remaining issue involves regional certification sys-
51. The prevailing interpretation within the Executive branch is that the commerce clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 3, empowers the Congress to regulate all activities of state and local
governments as well as of private entities that affect foreign commerce. Congress may do so
by enacting legislation that implements a trade agreement. Accordingly, the main issues in
the United States with respect to implementing agreements calling for federal regulation of
such activities are not constitutional ones, but the political questions of how much additional
federal regulation is acceptable and what forms it may take.
52. Potential signatories, other than the United States, that have federal forms of govern-
ment include Canada, Australia, and Switzerland.
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tems such as EEC-wide systems for certifying that products conform to
EEC standards. Again, the draft code requires participants to use all rea-
sonable means within their power to ensure that the systems are open to
suppliers from nonmember countries. Several participating governments
have questioned the adequacy of this requirement. The July 13 Status Re-
port links this issue to the first, stating that the negotiators "agree to seek a
balanced level of commitment and advantages for all adherents to the code
in regard to the development of product standards and in regard to related
certification requirements. '53
3. Customs Valuation
Most import duty rates are imposed on an ad valorem basis54-as a
percentage of the appraised value of the goods as determined by a customs
official at the point of entry. The method and accuracy of this appraisal can
be as important as the tariff rate itself in determining the actual amount of
the duty that is payable.
There are two basic problems with customs valuation methods cur-
rently used in international trade. The first is that there is little uniformity
among the methods used by different importing nations. As a result, the
same nominal tariff rate may have differing effects in different countries,
depending on the valuation method used and often on the arbitrary or
subjective judgment of a customs official. The second problem arises be-
cause several nations employ valuation methods that "uplift" or artificially
inflate the value of certain imported products. This inflation significantly
increases the amount of duty that is payable on an ad valorem basis.
The current GATT rules do not directly address the problem of arbi-
trary and nonuniform valuation methods, and are ineffectual in dealing
with methods that artificially inflate values. Article VII of the GATT pro-
vides that customs values "should be based on the actual value of the im-
ported merchandise on which duty is assessed, or of like merchandise, and
should not be based on the value of merchandise of national origin or on
arbitrary or fictitious values."'55 But the GATT does not require that any
particular method of valuation be used and thus leaves Contracting Parties
free to establish differing valuation systems.
The main purpose of the MTN negotiations on customs valuation is to
develop a new set of international rules that will harmonize divergent na-
tional valuation systems and reduce the possibility of artificially inflated
customs appraisals. Another purpose is to allow traders to predict with
53. Status Report, supra note 2, at 3.
54. Duty rates that are not specified as ad valorem may be specific, such as 10 cents per
pound, or compound, such as six percent plus three cents per pound.
55. GATr art. VII(2), 4 BISD at 12.
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more accuracy and certainty the value of their products for customs pur-
poses by introducing more objective valuation criteria.
The current U.S. system for customs valuation is an example of both
the unpredictability and the artificially "uplifting" characteristics that many
systems contain. Under the American system, there are nine different
methods for determining customs value, depending on the product being
valued and the circumstances under which the product is imported. One of
these nine valuation methods is the controversial American Selling Price
system, by which certain products are valued for tariff purposes at the level
of the domestically produced articles with which they compete.56 Applica-
tion of this system can inflate the payable duty by as much as one hundred
percent.57 This American Selling Price system was first enacted in 1922 and
thus is protected by "grandfathering" against the GATT admonition that
customs appraisals should not reflect "the value of merchandise of national
origin. . . or fictitious values." 58 The valuation systems of most other na-
tions also have controversial and protective features that create problems
for U.S. exporters.
The current draft customs code59 that is under consideration in the
Tokyo Round establishes the "transaction value"-defined as the price ac-
tually paid or payable with additions for certain costs possibly not reflected
in that price-as the most preferred valuation method. But transaction
value cannot be used in many cases, such as those involving non-arms-
length transactions between a subsidiary and a parent company. Accord-
ingly, the draft code establishes alternative bases of valuation, to be used in
order of precedence when the transaction value is inappropriate: the trans-
action value for an "identical good" preferably made by the same producer
but sold in a different transaction; the value of "similar goods" that are
produced in the same country and that are commercially interchangeable; a
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(e) (1976). The products subject to the American Selling Price sys-
tem include benzenoid chemicals, rubber footwear, and certain types of shellfish. See K.
DAM, supra note 16, at 189-92. For a detailed description of the system, see Targf9and Trade
Proposals: Hearings Before the House Comn on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 645
(1970) (statement of Ambassador Carl J. Gilbert, Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions).
57. See note 54 supra.
58. GAIT art. VII(2), 4 BISD at 12. Problems of customs valuation have persisted de-
spite the activites of the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC), an international organization
located in Brussels and composed of 81 member countries, and despite the conclusion of a
Convention on the Valuation of Goods for Customs Purposes (the Brussels Definition of
Value), which was drafted under CCC auspices. The Convention defines the customs value of
goods as "the price.., they would fetch... in the open market." The latitude provided by
this definition has permitted the values and duties payable to be inflated in many instances.
See P. Giguere, Development of New International Classflcation and Valuation Systems" Pro-
gress in Brussels, reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 212-23 (1978).
59. For additional descriptive material on the draft customs valuation code, see Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, Information Service Bulletin No. 9 (Fall 1978).
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"deductive value" based on the price of the good on resale after importa-
tion minus expenses involved in the resale; and a "computed value" based
on the estimated cost of production.
The July 13 Status Report notes that the draft customs code "repre-
sents a solid basis for instituting a harmonized international system for cus-
toms valuation which will provide a uniform and fair system of valuation in
conformity with the provisions of the GATT."' 60 Adoption of such a code
by the United States would lead to the elimination of the American Selling
Price method of valuation, a result that has been sought by U.S. trading
partners for several years. The Kennedy Round produced an agreement
that would have led to elimination of the American Selling Price system;
but as noted above,61 the United States did not implement this agreement.
Adoption and implementation of a customs agreement by the United States
would constitute a significant contribution to the MTN, for which the
United States would expect adequate reciprocal concessions on customs
matters or in some other area of the negotiations. This expectation, plus
the fact that American abandonment of the American Selling Price system
would coincide with the adoption of new tariff rates granting protection
similar to that now provided by the American Selling Price method, exem-
plifies how closely MTN subjects are intertwined.
4. Import Licensing
Products moving in international trade frequently are subject to need-
less bureaucratic delays and red tape as a result of cumbersome import li-
censing systems. The MTN includes an effort to limit such unnecessary
administrative impediments to trade by developing international rules lim-
iting the circumstances in which governments may require import licenses.
The Status Report speaks of this as an attempt to ensure that licensing
systems are employed by all countries only when necessary, are not
designed to distort trade, are transparent and are administered in a fair and
equitable manner. Separate draft texts cover restrictive licensing, by which
import quotas are administered, and automatic licensing, which is used for
nonrestrictive purposes such as the collection of statistics. At present, re-
strictive licenses are often administered arbitrarily and without disclosure
of the permitted quota amounts, and automatic licensing creates unneces-
sary burdens for importers.
5. Commercial Counteifeiting
International trade in counterfeit goods, ranging from imitation Levis
to spurious Swiss watches, is a serious and growing problem. This practice
60. Status Report, supra note 2, at 2.
61. See note 9 supra.
1979]
18 CORXELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
costs genuine producers both money and good will and defrauds consumers
who rely on false trademarks. Most countries participating in the MTN
seek to end these deceptive practices by strengthening existing international
rules. Embodied in article IX of the GATT 62 and article 9 of the Paris
Convention on Protection of Industrial Property,63 the existing rules pro-
vide generally that the member countries should cooperate with each other
in preventing the use of trade names in ways that misrepresent the true
origin of a product. The MTN is considering various means of tightening
these rules, such as supplementing the Paris Convention to require forfei-
ture, in addition to seizure, of counterfeit goods that are presented for im-
portation. The Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of
197864 now requires forfeiture of counterfeit merchandise when imported
into the United States. Negotiations in the MTN are aimed at extending
this U.S, requirement to an international agreement.
6. Rules of Origin
Most industrial products are manufactured from several components.
These components and their constituent materials often originate in differ-
ent countries. The application of an international trade measure to the
exported products of a particular country or group of countries implies the
use of some rule of origin to identify which products contain enough mater-
ials, components, or value-added from a particular country to be considered
products of that country.
The failure of the GATT to address this subject leaves the Contracting
Parties technically free to apply any rule of origin they choose. This can
lead to significant restrictions of international trade. For example, the
agreements on trade between the EEC and the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA)65 require in many cases that as much as ninety-five percent of a
product's value be of EEC or EFTA origin for the product to move freely
between the two trading blocs. This encourages manufacturers to purchase
components from within the trading bloc rather than from potentially more
efficient outside suppliers, creating a nontariff barrier to trade. This barrier
has had a particularly restrictive effect upon U.S. textile exports, because
the EEC and EFTA have refused to recognize clothing and other articles
made in Europe from U.S. cloth as "products of" EEC or EFTA bloc coun-
62. GATT art. IX, 4 BISD at 15.
63. done July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923; 24 U.S.T. 2140, T.I.A.S. No.
7727.
64. Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92 Stat. 888 (1978).
65. Seven nations-Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kindom-formed the European Free Trade Association largely in response to
the organization of the EEC by the "original six" (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and West Germany). See generaly EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AssocIATION,
BUILDING EFTA (1966).
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tries. The result is that, because such products cannot be traded freely be-
tween the EEC and EFTA blocs (and in fact are subject to very high duty
rates), European producers do not buy their raw textile materials from the
United States. U.S. negotiators have protested these restrictive rules of ori-
gin for several years, and these efforts may prove successful in the MTN.
III
REFORM OF THE TRADING SYSTEM
A. SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
Because the GATT is a system designed primarily to promote competi-
tion among private industries, the Contracting Parties have had difficulty
using GATT rules to regulate government subsidies to private industry.
This problem is not so acute with respect to those relatively few direct sub-
sidies explicitly granted to promote exports, since the GATT rules and set-
fled practice generally characterize these as unfair methods of competition.
Problems arise instead with respect to the myriad forms of subsidies that
are viewed by the governments granting them as legitimate instruments of
domestic socioeconomic policy, but that may almost incidentally confer ad-
vantages upon recipient industries in the international marketplace: nation-
alizations, tax holidays to invest in economically depressed regions,
concessionary loans or direct grants to maintain full employment during
recessions, and grants for research and development of new technology.
Such practices raise a central dilemma for the international trading system:
how to balance the freedom to make these sovereign national policy choices
against the collective rights of the international system.
1. Current State of the Law
The GATT rules on subsidies and countervailing duties seem straight-
forward. Article XVI prohibits export subsidies that produce a lower price
for exported industrial products than is charged domestically.66 Con-
tracting Parties must notify GATT signatories of any subsidy that increases
exports or decreases imports and must discuss these subsidies with other
66. GATT art. XVI(4), 4 BISD at 27, provides:
Further, as from I January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting
parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the
export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of
such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting
party shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 Janu-
ary 1955 by the introduction of new, or the extension of existing, subsidies.
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Contracting Parties upon request. Any "bounty or subsidy" that "cause(s)
or threaten(s) material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such
as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry" 67 may be
subject to the imposition by the importing nation of a countervailing duty
sufficient to offset the effect of the subsidy. Unfortunately, these decep-
tively simple rules are fraught with legal and political problems. The
GATT does not define export subsidy, which contributes to the difficulty of
distinguishing an export subsidy from a domestic one. The illustrative list
of prohibited export subsidies, developed in 1960, has helped guide resolu-
tion of complaints. But at the same time, it has limited the inquiry into
whether a violation has been committed to the simplistic question of
whether the challenged practice appears on the illustrative list.68 More-
over, it is not clear whether the practices on the illustrative list are pre-
sumed to result in dual pricing-the second requirement for establishing a
violation.69 If no such presumption exists, the prohibition may be unwork-
able, since it will usually be extremely difficult to prove a pattern of dual
pricing at the wholesale level.
U.S. countervailing duty law has created considerable international
friction because, unlike the GATT,70 it does not require a showing of mate-
rial injury to a domestic industry before sanctions will be imposed. In-
67. GATT art. VI(6)(a), 4 BISD at 11.
68. The list may in fact be obsolete. For example, it does not directly cover the U.S. and
EEC practices that a GATT panel recently found to constitute illegal export subsidies under
the GATT rules. The case involved an EEC complaint against the U.S. Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation (DISC) legislation and U.S. complaints against Belgium, France, and
the Netherlands. The United States defended the DISC on the ground that it permits an indefi-
nite deferral of income taxes on export income, but does not technically permit an exemption
or remission of such taxes--two of the prohibitions contained in the GATT illustrative list of
export subsidies. Similarly, the U.S. complaint against the Belgian, French, and Dutch prac-
tices was based on the fact that in those countries repatriated income from export subsidiaries
located in tax haven countries abroad was not taxed or was taxed at a very low rate-a practice
that is not explicitly covered by the illustrative list. The arguments before the panels and the
opinions of the panels in this case strained to characterize the challenged practices as falling
within one of the categories described in the illustrative fist, rather than consider whether the
practices themselves were unfair or were export subsidies that distorted international trade.
69. GATT art. XVI(4), 4 BISD at 27. See note 66 supra. The panel in the DISC and
EEC cases, note 68 supra, applied a rebuttable presumption that practices described in the
illustrative list result in dual pricing. This interpretation, however, is not required by the
language of GATT article XVI or by the illustrative list.
70. See note 67 supra. GATT article VI(6)(a) is clearly inconsistent with U.S. counter-
vailing duty law, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976). But the United States in 1947 undertook to apply
the GATT only to the extent that it is consistent with pre-existing U.S. legislation. Protocol of
Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A2051
(1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. The U.S. countervailing duty law, 19 U.S.C. §
1303 (1976) was first enacted in the 1890's. For an analysis of U.S. countervailing duty prac-
tice, see Marks & Malmgren, supra note 9, at 346-48; Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An
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stead, the Secretary of the Treasury must impose countervailing duties
upon dutiable imports71 that he finds have benefited from a "bounty or
grant." Understandably, other nations participating in the MTN wish to
secure U.S. adoption of an injury standard, whereas the United States
wants the GAIT rules to impose greater discipline on foreign governments
that indirectly confer competitive advantages upon their industries. These
factors alone comprise the essential ingredients of a stalemate.
Further, many U.S. traders feel that the GATT subsidy rules handicap
them by permitting governments to excuse or rebate indirect taxes on ex-
ported goods72 but not direct or income taxes.73 Because the United States
relies more heavily upon direct taxes than do many other nations, including
those of the EEC, U.S. exports to those countries allegedly bear not only the
full burden of U.S. income taxes, but also the indirect taxes assessed by the
importing countries, such as the levies imposed by the EEC under its system
of border tax adjustments.7 4 EEC exports to the United States, by contrast,
must bear only the proportionately smaller European income taxes in addi-
tion to any indirect taxes imposed by the United States. This discrepancy
permits EEC goods, as well as those of other nations, to be sold at more
favorable prices in the United States than American goods marketed
abroad.
Congress has objected strenuously to this feature of the GATT and, in
the Trade Act of 1974, directed the President to "take such action as may be
necessary. . .[to secure] the revision of GATT articles with respect to the
treatment of border adjustments for internal taxes to redress the disadvan-
tage to countries relying primarily on direct rather than indirect taxes for
revenue needs.'" 75 Some view such a revision as politically imperative for
Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax 4djustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing
Duty Law, 1 LAW & Po'Y INT'L Bus. 17, 19-38 (1969).
71. Countervailing duties may be imposed on duty free imports only after a showing of
injury. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(A) (1976). Because duty free goods were not subject to counter-
vailing duties until this provision was enacted as part of the Trade Act of 1974, supra note 22,
it does not benefit from the "grandfather" clause protection of countervailing duty law gener-
ally. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. See Comment, United States Countervailing
Duty Law: Renewed, Revamped and Revisited-Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
Rav. 832, 855-60 (1976).
72. GATT art. VI(4), 4 BISD at 11, provides:
No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty by
reason of the exemption of such product from duties or taxes borne by the like product
when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of
the refund of such duties or taxes.
73. As noted above, note 68 supra, the exemption or remission of direct taxes is one of the
practices set forth in the GATT illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies. See notes 28-29
supra and accompanying text.
74. For a more complete explanation of this complex system, see Feller, supra note 70.
75. 19 U.S.C. § 2131(a)(5) (1976). An American electronics manufacturer recently chal-
lenged a determination by the Treasury Department that a rebate of indirect taxes by the
Government of Japan did not constitute a bounty or grant within the meaning of U.S. counter-
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the United States; but the EEC nations and others consider it virtually non-
negotiable.
Negotiations on subsidies and countervailing duties are further compli-
cated by the fact that the 95th Congress adjourned without having extended
the statutory authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to waive the imposi-
tion of countervailing duties in certain cases in which subsidies are found to
exist. This waiver authority, which was enacted primarily to provide the
flexibility to prevent countervailing duties from becoming an undue irritant
to the negotiations, will expire on January 3, 1979. Unless some currently
unforeseen solution is found, the expiration of this authority will cause
countervailing duties to be imposed on seventeen articles for which the
waiver had been used, including several articles from the EEC for which
the offending subsidy was provided under the politically sensitive Common
Agricultural Policy. At this writing, U.S. and EEC negotiators are locked
in a "chicken and egg" stalemate over whether the subsidy negotiations
must first be concluded in the MTN before the U.S. waiver authority could
be extended, or whether the waiver authority must be extended before the
MTN negotiations can conclude.
2 Toward an Agreed Solution
As the July 13 Status Report implies, negotiators have produced an
outline agreement that attempts to balance the desire of EEC nations that
the United States adopt an injury standard for countervailing duty determi-
nations against U.S. demands for increased restraint of foreign government
subsidies. The outline agreement builds upon the current subsidy and
countervailing duty provisions in articles XVI and VI of the GATT. It
provides the first definition of an export subsidy and updates the illustrative
list of prohibited export subsidies.
The outline recognizes that politically sensitive domestic subsidies "are
intended to promote important objectives of national policy but may have
adverse effects, which signatories should seek to avoid, on the trade and
production interests of other signatories. '76 The United States prefers that
this qualified undertaking be backed by "indicative guidelines" specifying
the types of domestic subsidies that produce adverse trade effects and the
vailing duty law. This case posed a potential threat to U.S. international trade relations be-
cause a holding for the plaintiff would have required the Treasury to assess penalty duties
against the Japanese electronic products and, by extension of the principle, against many other
products from other countries. To do so would squarely contradict article VI(4) of the GATT.
But this threat faded when the United States Supreme Court held unanimously that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury had acted within his statutory discretion in determining that the Japanese
practice was not a bounty or grant under U.S. law. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 98 S.
Ct. 2441 (1978).
76. MTN Outline of An Arrangement with respect to Subsidies and Countervailing Du-
ties (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal).
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ways in which such effects can be avoided. Whether these guidelines will
be made part of the agreement has not been settled.
The outline agreement establishes a "two-track" approach to offset the
effects of subsidized imports. The first track would follow the traditional
rule of applying countervailing duties to subsidized imports that cause or
threaten material injury to a domestic industry. The United States would
undertake to add an injury standard to federal countervailing duty law, in
return for the exercise by other Contracting Parties of satisfactory addi-
tional discipline over foreign subsidy practices. In addition to this tradi-
tional response, the second track would permit the imposition of
countermeasures against any subsidy practice that results in "serious
prejudice" to another signatory country. The concept of serious prejudice,
which has little meaning in GATT article XVI(1), 77 might include not only
adverse effects upon domestic industries from the increase in subsidized
goods imported, but also the loss of export markets. These export markets
could be diminished either by alternative purchases of subsidized goods
rather than imported products within the subsidizing country or by the
competitive advantage the subsidized goods would have in third countries
where they compete with imports from nations that do not subsidize their
exports. Extension of countermeasures to these situations would signifi-
cantly strengthen GATT discipline over subsidy practices.
Important issues concerning the use of countermeasures remain un-
resolved. In the American view, when a subsidy rule is violated, such as by
use of an export subsidy enumerated on the illustrative list, serious
prejudice to the affected country should be presumed and that nation
should be permitted to impose countermeasures pending an international
review. The EEC nations and other countries believe that the affected na-
tion should only be able to take such countermeasures after an international
review.
As the Status Report indicates, special subsidy rules for developing
countries are still under consideration. One possible provision, which has
not been generally accepted, would apply somewhat less stringent rules to
the infant industries of developing countries, but would require such special
treatment to be phased out as the industry becomes internationally compet-
itive.
The outline agreement would also tighten the reporting requirements
and the international mechanism for reviewing subsidy practices and coun-
77. GATT art. XVI(1), 4 BISD at 26, provides:
In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any
other contracting party is caused or threatened by any. . . subsidization, the con-
tracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other con-
tracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility
of limiting the subsidization.
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tervailing duties. The agreement would establish a Committee of Signato-
ries that would meet periodically to apply the reporting requirements and
dispute settlement mechanism.
B. SAFEGUARDS
Every country needs a safety valve when import competition seriously
injures a domestic industry and idles its workers. Article XIX of the GATT
and related provisions in U.S. legislation78 contain such escape clauses that
permit temporary use of import barriers in such cases, ostensibly to allow
the domestic industry an opportunity to adjust, provided certain conditions
are met.79 U.S. escape clause legislation and the GATT differ in some mi-
nor respects, but there have been no international challenges to U.S. safe-
guard actions. This probably is because the United States is one of the few
nations that even pretends to observe the rules of article XIX.
Article XIX requires that a country planning to invoke the escape
clause notify the GATT Secretariat in advance if possible80 and consult
with affected Contracting Parties upon request.8' If these consultations do
not produce agreement, the Contracting Party invoking the escape clause
may raise trade barriers for the product concerned. Affected countries may
withdraw "substantially equivalent concessions" by erecting trade barriers
of their own.8 2 But these provisions plus the growing ineffectiveness of the
GATT dispute settlement mechanisms83 have combined to create a disin-
centive for Contracting Parties to take import relief measures within the
discipline of the GATT escape clause provisions. This is because in the
absence of a settlement, these provisions permit affected countries to retali-
ate quickly and directly against an escape clause action. By contrast, the
slow pace of international dispute settlement procedures under GATT arti-
cle XXIII affords a reasonable assurance that by simply erecting a trade
barrier unilaterally a Contracting Party is less likely to suffer GATT-
sanctioned trade retaliation than if it follows the escape clause procedures
prescribed in article XIX. Many countries therefore do not use article XIX
procedures when restricting trade. The United States, Australia, and Ca-
78. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976).
79. These conditions are that: "as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under [the] GATT. . . [a] product is being
imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury .... " GATT art. XIX(l)(a), 4 BISD at
36.
80. Article XIX(2) of the GATT provides that advance notice can be dispensed with "[i]n
critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair
.... .4 BISD at 37.
81. Id.
82. This provision is set forth in GATT art. XIX(l)(b), 4 BISD at 36.
83. For an analysis of this problem, see J. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 81, 750, 757; Roschke,
supra note 13, at 89.
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nada have been the only countries to use article XIX as a general practice in
recent years.
The history of article XIX clearly establishes that escape clause actions
are to be taken on a most favored nation basis: a country must apply tem-
porary import restrictions equally to imports from all sources. U.S. legisla-
tion, however, permits the President to impose U.S. escape clause import
relief other than on a most favored nation basis, "but only after considera-
tion of the relation of such actions to the international obligations of the
United States."84 This transfers from Congress to the President the onus of
imposing import restrictions against a particular country.
The problem with the GATT's requirement that escape clause actions
be based on the most favored nation principle is that in recent years coun-
tries have chosen for political reasons to restrict imports on a selective basis,
that is, against products of one or two countries only. Several reasons may
be advanced for this: an import surge may be attributable to the export
policies of only one or two nations;8 5 the importing nation may fear the
consequences of limiting imports from a major trading partner; or the im-
porting country may find it easier to obtain authority to restrict the imports
of only one or two countries than to limit all imports. Countries that have
taken these selective actions have circumvented GATT discipline by impos-
ing orderly marketing agreements upon selected trading partners or by sur-
reptitiously securing "voluntary" export restraint commitments from
certain exporting countries.8 6 More recently, GATT Contracting Parties
have shown a willingness to impose selective actions upon countries that
have not agreed to them. For example, the United Kingdom recently im-
posed a selective action against imports of televisions from the Republic of
Korea. Orderly marketing agreements avoid the usual GATT require-
ments of reporting, consulting, settling amicably, or suffering retaliation be-
cause the Contracting Party against whom such agreements are imposed
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(k) (1976).
85. The United States took selective actions in June 1977 against footwear imports from
Taiwan and Korea and against television imports from Japan by negotiating "orderly market-
ing agreements" with those countries. Under the agreements, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan
agreed to restrain their exports and the United States agreed to limit its imports of footwear
and televisions at specified levels. See 42 Fed. Reg. 18,269, 32,440 (1977) (agreement regard-
ing footwear and Presidential proclamation implementing it); 42 Fed. Reg. 26,195, 32,747
(1977) (agreement regarding televisions and Presidential proclamation implementing it).
86. In general trade usage, a "voluntary restraint agreement" or "voluntary export re-
straint" is an agreement that requires the exporting country to limit its exports of the product
in question to the country that has imposed the agreement. These agreements may be publicly
announced or may be confidential. For a discussion of their legality under U.S. law prior to
enactment of the Trade Act, see Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319
(D.D.C. 1973), aqj'din part sub non. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). An "orderly market agreement," by con-
trast, is a term of art in U.S. law, meaning a public agreement pursuant to an escape clause
action under the Trade Act restraining both exports and imports. See W. CLINE, N.
KAWANABE, T. KRONSJO & T. WLLUtMS, supra note 33, at 198-200, 204.
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usually "agrees" to waive these requirements. "Voluntary" export re-
straints can be more pernicious still, since they are frequently confidential
arrangements that avoid both international and domestic political disci-
pline.87
The failur& of Contracting Parties to observe the requirements of arti-
cle XIX is perhaps the basic problem with this article of the GATT.88
Congress recognized this difficulty in the Trade Act of 1974, when it di-
rected the President to seek "the revision of article XIX of the GATT into a
truly international safeguard procedure which takes into account all forms
of import restraints countries use in response to injurious competition or
threat of such competition .... -89 The Tokyo Round negotiators have
developed a draft integrated text for a safeguards code that builds upon
article XIX. This code would eliminate the concepts of retaliation and
compensation, which have discouraged the use of article XIX, by tightening
reporting requirements and establishing more precise conditions and crite-
ria for invoking safeguard actions. If the provisions of the new code were
followed, countries would not normally be expected to suffer retaliation.
Although the basic right to retaliate would remain, retaliation would not be
presumed to be the appropriate response.
The most important issue of the safeguards negotiations is the use of
selective safeguards that lack any most favored nation element. This issue
has not yet been resolved. After preliminary sparring, the industrialized
countries have agreed to permit some form of selectivity. What remains to
be settled are the conditions:90 whether import restraints against selected
countries will be permitted only with their acquiescence, only with the con-
sent of a GATT review body absent the acquiescence of affected countries,
or unilaterally if neither agreement nor international consent can be se-
cured promptly. Positions of the participating countries on these questions
tend to coincide with national self-images as beneficiaries or victims of es-
cape clause actions. Because of severe internal political pressure to limit
import competition in various sectors, the EEC nations have strongly advo-
cated a flexible selectivity provision. Japan and the developing countries
have either opposed the concept or supported it only when it was accompa-
nied by strict conditions on the use of selective actions. It may be from the
safeguards negotiations that developing countries have the most to fear
87. A secret voluntary restraint agreement that restricted exports of steel from Japan to the
EEC was the subject of a complaint filed by the U.S. Iron and Steel Institute. The complaint
alleged that, by diverting steel from-Japan to the U.S. market, the agreement constituted an
unfair trade practice within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976). This complaint was filed
in 1976. It is reported at 42 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1976).
88. Roschke, supra note 13, at 94.
89. 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976).
90. See Status Report, supra note 2, at 7: "the question of how and under what circum-
stances and conditions a selective application of safeguard measures would be provided for in
the code, is still a subject of intensive negotiations."
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from the MTN. As some of these nations rapidly improve their export
performances in particular sectors, their relative political powerlessness
makes them easy targets for selective restraints. The developing countries
noted this concern in their formal comment on the Status Report prepared
by the industrialized countries.91
C. DEVELOPING NATIONS
One of the cornerstones of the post-World War II international trading
system is the most favored nation principle: "any advantage, favour, privi-
lege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originat-
ing in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territo-
ries of all other contracting parties."'92 Developing countries have long
sought modification of this principle to permit some forms of special treat-
ment for their exports. One result of this effort was the adoption of the
Generalized System of Preferences, which allows selected exports from de-
veloping countries to enter the markets of developed countries at lower duty
rates than those applied to the same products from developed countries. 93
But the Generalized System of Preferences is merely one facet of
north-south trading relations. Moreover, it only took effect through a tem-
porary waiver by the GATT Contracting Parties.94 In the MTN, the devel-
oping countries have sought to establish a permanent basis for the
Generalized System of Preferences and to broaden the possibilities for spe-
cial treatment. They achieved a measure of success in this effort at the
outset of the MTN by securing recognition in the Tokyo Declaration that
"special and more favorable" treatment might be provided in appropriate
cases.
95
A second important gain by developing countries from the MTN may
be the adoption of an enabling clause that would make special treatment
for the products of developing countries a permanent feature of the interna-
tional trading system. It would also include a rule of "graduation" from
91. "The Statement by some major trading nations does not adequately reflect certain
issues of major concern to developing countries and has omitted others, such as ... the princi-
ple that safeguard actions should not discriminate against developing countries... "' State-
ment by Delegations of Developing Countries on Current Status of Tokyo Round
Negotiations, GATT Doe. MTN/INF/38 (July 14, 1978) (on file at the Cornell International
Law Journal).
92. GATT art. I(1), 4 BISD at 2.
93. For an extended discussion of the Generalized System of Preferences, see Graham,
.supra note 43.
94. The waiver by which the GATT Contracting Parties permitted the most favored na-
tion principle to be abrogated for a 10 year period, in order to permit the Generalized System
of Preferences to operate, is set forth in GATT Doe. L/3545 (1971), reprinted in BISD (18th
Supp.) 24 (1972).
95. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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this special status, so that each developing country would take on increasing
responsibilities under the GATT when its level of development advanced.
Moreover, as the clause is currently envisioned, it would prohibit special
deals between developed countries and selected developing nations. De-
veloped countries would have to afford special treatment to all developing
countries in similar economic circumstances, which would permit some
benefits to go only to the poorest developing countries. The clause would
recognize the Generalized System of Preferences as the only legitimate
form of tariff preference and subject preferential arrangements among de-
veloping countries to greater control under the GATT.
D. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Systems of international rules such as the GATT may encourage com-
pliance in at least three ways. First, unless the system is a dead letter, its
mere existence influences the policy decisions of member governments, who
would be reluctant to violate the system's rules openly. Defiance of the
system undermines the common interest that led to its formation. The
GATT has played this persuasive role reasonably well over the years, with
notable exceptions in the areas of agriculture, subsidies, and safeguards,
where the current rules are increasingly obsolete.96 One of the primary but
unspoken purposes of many parts of the MTN is to assure the system's
conformity with the norms of its members so that it can again exercise a
degree of moral authority.
Self-policing obviously has its limits. Sovereign governments may
choose to violate their international obligations for overriding policy or po-
litical reasons. At other times, practices may fall into gray areas where
compliance is in doubt, and there will always be situations not provided for
by the rules. Thus, as a second means of promoting compliance, members
of the system can build an organizational structure and consultative provi-
sions that can adapt the rule system to new circumstances and defuse
problems before they reach the confrontation stage. A third means of en-
couraging compliance is to deal competently with confrontations that do
arise over alleged infractions of the rules.
The GATT, a small organization that grew almost accidentally 97
around a set of contractual rules, has had difficulty adapting to changing
realities and anticipating problems other than those involving adherence to
its rules. Whether this rigidity will continue depends more on the nature of
the GATT institution after the Tokyo Round is concluded than on changes
in the GATT rules. Negotiators are currently discussing proposals to ex-
96. See notes 65-91 supra and accompanying text; notes 110-28 infra and accompanying
text.
97. See note 6 supra.
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pand the GATT Secretariat and give it more responsibility for bringing
issues before the Contracting Parties. No specific proposals have emerged,
however, and the outcome of these discussions is difficult to predict.
Adoption of nontariff codes, each with its own GATT steering group
and consultative provisions, may well increase the ability of the GATT sys-
tem to avert problems and respond to new circumstances. In the area of
dispute settlement, negotiators have paid closest attention to the way the
GATT deals with alleged rule violations and other actions that nullify or
impair benefits accruing to Contracting Parties. Under current GATT
rules, the first step toward resolving such disputes involves consultations
between the complaining government and the government against which
the complaint is lodged.98 If consultations do not resolve the problem, the
Contracting Parties review the issue, using a small panel of independent
experts or a larger working party of national representatives. The panel or
working party conducts a hearing and may attempt to mediate an amicable
settlement.99 If this is impossible, the group issues a report that may rec-
ommend that the offending practice be changed. The GATT rules also
authorize trade retaliation against recalcitrant countries. But because of
concern that this weapon would start a chain of retaliation that would de-
feat the system's basic purposes, it has been used only once in the history of
the GATT.10 Since authorized retaliation is not a realistic threat, the
principal effect of an adverse finding by a GATT panel or working party is
to create international peer pressure against the offending government.
Such pressure may have the practical effect of costing the offending country
bargaining leverage in future trade disputes or negotiations.
These procedures for dispute settlement have become increasingly
ineffective in recent years. They lack specific rules and time limits for con-
ducting hearings, so that the selection of panelists, adoption of procedures,
and settlement of the dispute may take years. 10 1 The likelihood of delay is
98. Such consultations may be requested under GATT art. XXII, 4 BISD at 39, which
provides only for consultations among the parties to a dispute with a view toward amicable
settlement. Alternatively, consultations may be held under GATT art. XXIII(l), 4 BISD at
39-40, as the required first step toward referring the dispute to the Contracting Parties for
adjudication.
99. There is disagreement over the extent to which panels should attempt to mediate dis-
putes. Although the GATT has traditionally called its panels "panels of conciliation" in rec-
ognition of the fact that the GATT is a consensual body without autonomous enforcement
powers, some have argued that the proper role of panels is only to decide whether the com-
plaining party's allegations have been sustained, leaving possible settlement to another stage of
the proceeding. In practice the extent to which panels mediate disputes put before them varies
from panel to panel.
100. The one case in which trade retaliation took place involved a complaint by the Nether-
lands against U.S. trade restrictions on dairy imports. The Contracting Parties authorized the
Netherlands to impose import quotas upon U.S. wheat exports. See J. JAcKSON, spra note 6,
at 172, citing the decision appearing at BISD (1st Supp.) 23 (1953).
101. The DISC dispute, note 68 supra, took three and one-half years from the time the
complaint was filed until the issuance of the reports by the panels.
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increased by the lack of a roster of prospective panelists. Moreover, the
legal standards for reviewing complaints have become cumbersome, 102 a
problem that is complicated by disagreement over whether mediation or
judicial decisionmaking should be the primary means of settling disputes.
Negotiators are considering measures to remedy each of these problems
with the GATT dispute settlement process: introduction of time limits for
each stage of a proceeding; establishment of procedures and creation of a
roster of panelists; and clarification of the respective roles of mediation and
judicial decisionmaking.
Another limitation on the effectiveness of the article XXIII dispute set-
tlement procedures is that their relationship to the nontariff codes is still
unsettled. At present, the codes on subsidies, countervailing duties, stand-
ards, and other nontariff subjects contain their own dispute settlement pro-
visions, which resemble those of a reformed article XXIII. But it remains
unclear whether the final agreement will retain this approach or provide
instead for resolution of all disputes arising under any of the codes in ac-
cordance with a reformed article XXIII.
E. OTHER MEASURES FOR GENERAL REFORM
The United States is also urging reform of the international rules on
export restrictions and limitations of trade for balance of payments pur-
poses. Like import duties, export restrictions under the GATT must be
imposed on a nondiscriminatory, most favored nation basis. They are also
limited by the general prohibition against quantitative restrictions upon ex-
ports or imports. 10 3 Nevertheless, there is no general recognition of their
potentially disruptive impact on trade or of the possibility that importing
countries may have a right of access to supplies of vital commodities. An
American initiative to establish these principles, obviously inspired by the
102. Under article XXIII(1) of the GATT, a Contracting Party may complain on the
ground that
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified
or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded
as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not
it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation ....
GAIT art. XXIII(l), 4 BISD at 39-40.
103. Article XI(l) of the GATT provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be insti-
tuted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or salefor export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GAIT art. XI(l), 4 BISD at 17 (emphasis added).
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1973 oil embargo conducted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, is still under general consideration.
The existing international rules governing trade-restrictive measures
imposed to remedy balance of payments emergencies are no longer ade-
quate. 1°4 For no apparent reason, the relevant GATT articles permit na-
tions to use only import quotas, rather than tariff surcharges, to deal with
these emergencies. These articles conflict with widely held views on trade
policy.105 Moreover, there are no adequate provisions for removing import
quotas once they have been imposed, so that many import quotas that are
no longer justified remain in effect.' 0 6 Measures to deal with these
problems are under consideration in MTN's "GATT reform" section.
F. SECTORAL NEGOTIATIONS
The MTN has focused primarily upon functional areas-standards,
safeguards, subsidies' 07-rather than upon particular industries. 0 8 Negoti-
ators can, however, concentrate instead on factors that affect trade in a par-
ticular sector.10 9 For example, negotiations could explore changes in tariffs
and nontariff barriers, as well as investment patterns, in a single industry.
Despite congressional endorsement of this sectoral approach, it has been
subordinate to the functional approach. An MTN sectors group organized
by the United States has produced little in its first three years other than
general studies of international trade in electronics, aluminum, and a few
other sectors.
The worldwide recession in the steel industry and intense competition
between EEC nations and the United States in the aircraft industry within
the past eighteen months have given considerably more significance to
104. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 715-16.
105. A tariff surcharge at least preserves the possibility of continued market access for very
efficient producers. A quota, by contrast, is an absolute bar to market access no matter how
efficient the producer may be. Accordingly, tariff surcharges generally have been viewed as a
less onerous form of import restraint. Id at 711-14.
106. Id. at 708-09.
107. See notes 50-53, 66-91 supra and accompanying text.
108. This is true to a somewhat lesser extent with respect to tariff negotiations, where each
country's negotiators look carefully at the effect of prospective tariff reductions upon important
industries, even though the negotiations are not formally or expressly conducted on a sector by
sector basis.
109. The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Trade Act of 1974, S. Rep. No. 1298,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, states
with respect to sectors:
The requirement for achieving equivalence of competitive opportunities within sectors
does not require equal tariff and non-tariff barriers for each, narrowly defined product
within a sector, but overall equal competitive opportunities within a sector. The
Committee feels that appropriate product sectors would include, among others, such
industries as steel, aluminum, electronics, chemicals and electrical machinery, all of
which should lend themselves to a sector negotiating technique.
Id. at 79, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7229.
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sectoral negotiations. In steel, widespread unemployment and idle capac-
ity fueled protectionist pressures against Japanese exports, making it appar-
ent that an international understanding was the only alternative to a "steel
war." The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) is attempting to establish a Steel Committee under OECD aus-
pices to encourage free trade in steel, provide a means of disseminating
information, and coordinate national policies on the steel trade. In addi-
tion to watching the progress of these negotiations, MTN participants are
exploring the possibility of engaging in sectoral discussions on tariff equali-
zation among the major developed countries for certain products.
With respect to aircraft, delegations are studying the elimination of
import duties on aircraft and aircraft parts and of the U.S. duty on repairs
performed abroad on U.S. aircraft. The United States wishes to broaden
the scope of this agreement to include an understanding limiting predatory
aircraft financing practices.
G. AGRICULTURE
Agricultural trade presents some of the most intractable but, for the
United States at least, most politically important issues of the MTN. As
the world's largest exporter of agricultural products," l0 the United States
has several objectives: gaining greater access to foreign markets now nearly
closed to many important U.S. agricultural exports; obtaining assurances
that competition between the United States and other exporting nations for
the markets of third countries is reasonably fair; and improving the overall
application of the GATT rules to agricultural trade. The EEC member
states, by contrast, are large importers of several types of agricultural prod-
ucts,"1' and a growing exporter of others. 12 Other major MTN partici-
pants, such as Japan, impose strict quotas on many agricultural imports.
They, the EEC, and others might prefer to avoid any negotiated changes in
the agricultural area.
Behind the agricultural negotiations lies a largely unsuccessful history
of attempts to apply the GATT system to a product sector that has been
subject to unchecked economic nationalism in most countries. For exam-
ple, early in the GATT's operation the United States pushed through a
110. UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1976, 438-40 (1977).
111. The EEC nations import especially large quantities of "foodgrains," such as wheat, for
human consumption and "feedgrains," such as corn, for animals.
112. The EEC nations are growing and ambitious exporters of dairy products (such as
Danish cheese), as well as some meats and grains. For a European perspective on agricultural
trade policy, see Speech by Finn Olav Gundelanch, Vice President, Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, before the Symposium on World Agricultural Trade and its Potential for
Growth, Kansas City, Mo. (May 18, 1978) (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal).
In the U.S. view, however, the EEC export drive is a direct consequence of its domestic farm
policy, which encourages the production of European agricultural surpluses. These surpluses
are then disposed of in the world market by means of substantial government subsidies.
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GATT waiver1 13 permitting the United States to impose additional tariffs
or quotas on agricultural imports that were "interfering with a program of
the Department of Agriculture."' 1 4 Soon thereafter, the EEC instituted its
Common Agricultural Policy, which created a single EEC agricultural sys-
tem and established trade barriers designed to keep the prices of certain
domestic farm products below those of competing imports. 1 5 But because
the Common Agricultural Policy has no specific authorization, other parties
may allege that the levies imposed on imported goods violate GATT
rules.1 16 Also deviating from GATT principles are the Japanese quotas on
various agricultural products 17 that were originally imposed for balance-
of-payments purposes but have been maintained in spite of unprecedented
Japanese trade surpluses.' 8 The GATT rules contain several other excep-
tions, almost all of which may be invoked to promote domestic agricultural
policies.' 19
113. Article XXV(5) of the GATT specifies that the Contracting Parties may, by a two-
thirds vote, grant waivers from GATT obligations to one or more of their number. GATT art.
XXV(5), 4 BISD at 44-45.
114. The waiver, BISD (3d Supp.) 32 (1955), permits the United States to impose tariff
surcharges ("fees") or quotas on agricultural imports under § 22 of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1976). Section 22 authorizes the President, upon recom-
mendation of the Secretary of Agriculture, to impose such quotas or fees upon imports if he
determines that such imports are interfering with a program of the Department of Agriculture.
See K. KOCK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND THE GATT 1947-1967, 162-64 (1969).
115. The Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC employs a system of "variable levies"
and "minimum import prices" to prevent entry of imports at prices lower than those of domes-
tic farm goods. One commentator has concluded that "the [variable] levy tends to isolate do-
mestic markets in compartments of unprecedented impermeability." Dam, The European
Common Market in Agri'culture, 67 COLuM. L. Rnv. 209, 218 (1967). See generally J. JACK-
SON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 979-1008 (1977). In the
U.S. view, this EEC agricultural system has been used to restrict trade to a much greater extent
than has the U.S. authority under section 22, see note 114 supra, which is in fact the subject of
a formal GATT waiver.
116. See [19771 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 56 (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal). This
case originated with a complaint to the Special Trade Representative by the National Canner's
Association pursuant to § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2441 (1976). A copy of
this complaint appears at 40 Fed. Reg. 44,635 (1975).
117. These points among others were the subject of intense discussions between representa-
tives of the U.S. and Japanese Governments in late 1977. See Testimony of Ambassador
Alan Wim. Wolff, Deputy Special Trade Representative, before the East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Subcomm., Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Apr. 27, 1978 (on file at the Cornell
International Law Journal).
118. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1977, at 51, col. 6.
119. These exceptions, most of which are set forth in article XI(2) of the GATT, permit the
imposition of quotas in the following circumstances:
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve
critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting
party,
(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of
standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in
international trade;
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The Tokyo Round's agricultural negotiations have attempted to ad-
dress various problem areas: market access for exports, international price
and supply stabilization for specific commodities, fair competitive condi-
tions among exporters to third-country markets, and the overall application
of the international trading rules to agriculture. The success or failure of
the MTN may depend upon the ability of the negotiators to reconcile the
differing interests of the participants in each of these areas.
For the United States, a longstanding perception that the American
agricultural market is more open than those of major U.S. trading partners
makes increased market access for a number of important U.S. farm prod-
ucts politically essential for a successful negotiation. Improving U.S. mar-
ket access, however, appears to require a fundamental shift in the
philosophy of the Common Agricultural Policy. Apparently the only way
to improve access to the European market is to secure an EEC commitment
to import more agricultural products within the context of the Common
Agricultural Policy, since a limit on that policy's basic provisions appears
nonnegotiable.
The United States is also concerned by the subsidies other trading na-
tions use to increase exports of their farm products. Such agricultural subsi-
dies, like their industrial counterparts, 120 give the subsidized products an
unfair advantage in the competition for world export markets. The GATT
exercises little discipline over agricultural subsidies, specifying only that
Contracting Parties "should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export
of primary products."' 121 In addition, subsidies that increase the subsi-
dizing country's exports "shall not be applied in a manner which results in
that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world export
trade in that product. ' 122 Not only is the obligation not to subsidize agri-
cultural exports precatory rather than mandatory, but "an equitable share
of world export trade" is such an imprecise concept that the provision is
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any
form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be mar-
keted or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like
product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly sub-
stituted, or
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no
substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which
the imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to
certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the current
market level; or
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product the
production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported com-
modity, if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively negligible.
GATT art. XI(2), 4 BISD at 17-18.
120. See notes 65-77 supra and accompanying text.
121. GATT, art. XVI(3), 4 BISD at 26-27.
122. Id
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little more than an exhortation. In both the negotiations on subsidies1 23
and those on agricultural trade, the United States is attempting to
strengthen this GATT provision.
In response to these U.S. initiatives, the EEC and other nations are
seeking agreements to stabilize the price and supply of certain commodi-
ties.124 The International Wheat Agreement, which would replace a simi-
lar agreement that expired last June, 125 is a classic commodity agreement
that is being negotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD at the Interna-
tional Grains Conference in London.126 MTN participants will examine
the results of these negotiations to determine whether they have achieved
the crucial agricultural balance. The emerging agreement being developed
will attempt to stabilize prices within an acceptable range through a system
of nationally held reserves, which will be accumulated when world prices
are low and released when prices are high. It also will provide for a pro-
gram of additional measures, such as production controls, that may be un-
dertaken by parties to the agreement in the event that the reserve actions
fail to stabilize the market. Although a consensus has been reached on the
basic structure of the wheat agreement, many important issues remain un-
resolved. These include the size of the reserves and individual country
shares of them, the price levels that will trigger reserve accumulation and
release, and possible assistance to developing countries in financing their
reserve shares.
The EEC has argued that because of the close relationship between
wheat and feedgrain markets (wheat can be used for feed under certain
price conditions), a wheat agreement could have an effect on the feedgrain
market. Accordingly, the EEC has sought to formulate an agreement on
coarse grains with provisions paralleling those proposed by the EEC for
wheat. Most other countries are not willing to undertake commitments to
stablize the international feedgrain markets. The United States already
undertakes a number of measures as part of its domestic farm program that
contribute significantly to stabilization of the international feedgrain mar-
ket. But because of the unwillingness of other countries to undertake com-
mitments such as utilization adjustments to help stabilize the market, the
United States is also opposed to the conclusion of a feedgrain agreement
containing economic provisions.
123. See notes 65-77 supra and accompanying text.
124. These commodities include wheat, coarse grains, meat, and dairy products. These
arrangements are viewed as multilateral solutions designed to address some of the fundamen-
tal problems associated with international trade in specific commodities. Many of these
problems, such as price instability, cannot be dealt with in the traditional trade negotiating
context--that is, through a reduction in trade barriers.
125. Memorandum of Agreement on Basic Elements for the Negotiation of a World Grains
Arrangement, GATT Doe. L/2814 (1967).
126. This conference is known formally as the United Nations Conference to Negotiate an
International Arrangement to Replace the International Wheat Agreement, 197 1, as extended.
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The MTN negotiators are also discussing the possibility of a commod-
ity agreement establishing minimum world prices for certain dairy prod-
ucts. The dairy agreement would create a consultative body under the
auspices of the GATT for considering problems in world dairy trade. The
moving forces behind the dairy negotiations have been the EEC and New
Zealand. The United States, however, has not placed a high priority on
these negotiations, because the minimum prices would probably be well
below current U.S. domestic support prices for dairy products127 and thus
would have no direct effect on the U.S. dairy industry.
An international meat arrangement, which would cover trade in live
cattle and most types of beef and edible cattle products, is also being con-
sidered by negotiators. It would create another advisory council to facili-
tate consultations and the flow of information about international trade in
meat. In its present form, the arrangement would not contain economic
provisions.
Finally, the July 13 Status Report describes a possible "general under-
standing on agriculture" that "could provide a framework for avoiding con-
tinuing political and commercial confrontations in this highly sensitive
sector ... .-"128 This understanding would probably begin with the estab-
lishment of a GATT consultation committee, which may ultimately pro-
duce greater international control of agricultural trade.
H. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The goal set by the Tokyo Declaration-that developing countries be
granted special and more favorable treatment to the extent appropriate
and feasible-has been difficult to develop into specific proposals. Natu-
rally, the developing countries have emphasized the call for special treat-
ment, taking a dim view of the GATT's heavy reliance upon the principle
of equal treatment for all nations.129 By contrast, the developed countries
emphasize that feasibility and appropriateness should be considered in pur-
suing the goal of special treatment. They regard the more extreme de-
mands to be irritants in an already difficult negotiation. 130 The July 13
Status Report highlights this polarization, since it was solely the work of the
developed country representatives and was answered by a separate, wary
statement by the developing nations. 13 '
The developing countries do, however, appear to have a realistic
127. 7 U.S.C. § 1446 (1976).
128. Status Report, supra note 2, at 6.
129. Ibrahim, Developing Countries and the Tokyo Round, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1978);
Note, Trade Preferencesfor Developing Countries: Optionsfor Ordering International Economic
and Political Relations, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1150, 1164-67 (1968).
130. Id. at 1170-76.
131. See Statement by Developing Countries, supra note 91.
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chance of using the MTN to improve their position in the international
trading system. First, some of the draft agreements, such as those dealing
with product standards and customs matters, call for the developed nations
to extend technical assistance to the developing country signatories. Such
assistance could eventually be extended beyond the narrow goal of helping
the developing nations to comply with the provisions of the agreements.
Second, and perhaps most important, the negotiations have focused on
producing an enabling clause, which would explicitly permit some forms of
"special and more favourable treatment" for developing countries,132 in
contrast to the basic GATT principle of equal treatment. Such a clause
would have to include a principle of "graduation," to require less developed
nations to accept increasing responsibilities under the GATT system as
their levels of development increase. Although the enabling clause would
provide only the possibility of differential treatment in the future, its impor-
tance as a wedge in the strict most favored nation principle should not be
underestimated.
Third, several of the MTN codes may grant substantive trade benefits
to developing countries. For example, the government procurement code
will probably place fewer restrictions on the ability of the developing coun-
tries to protect their government purchasing entities from the code's re-
quirements of open bid solicitation, criteria, and award announcements.
The code on subsidies and countervailing duties may permit some type of
"infant industry" subsidization, which is particularly important to less de-
veloped nations. In addition, the safeguards code may encourage the struc-
turing of escape clause actions to minimize the restrictive effect upon
exports by these countries.
Finally, apart from obtaining special treatment, developing countries
can improve their position in the international trading system by influenc-
ing the development of new rules in various areas of international trade,
such as subsidies, escape clause safeguards, and dispute settlement. The
promotion of fairness in these areas would serve the interests of developed
and developing nations alike.
I. RELATIONSHIP OF THE MTN AND THE GATT:
CONDITIONAL MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS
As the Tokyo Round draws to a close, one of the fundamental ques-
tions that remains unanswered concerns what will happen if some GATT
Contracting Parties refuse to join in the final agreements reached by the
MTN. The most favored nation principle of equal treatment for all trading
nations has given rise in the past to the free rider phenomenon-a nation
benefits from duty reductions implemented by other nations under the most
132. Declaration of Ministers, supra note 18, at 21.
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favored nation principle, for example, but does not reduce its own duty rate
by an equivalent amount. 133 This possibility has always discouraged par-
ticipation in negotiating rounds for those who are eager to avoid incurring
international obligations. The Tokyo Round presents the same problem
with respect to each of the nontariff codes. After all, why should any coun-
try, particularly a developing country that believes it may not be receiving
adequate special treatment, join a code and expose its own customs, regula-
tory, purchasing, or subsidizing entities to new international discipline, if it
can receive the same benefits without incurring any cost?
This possibility has led major participants in the MTN nontariff nego-
tiations to adopt the position that the benefits and obligations of each
nontariff code would apply only to the code's signatories.134 This "condi-
tional most favored nation status" would, however, raise difficult problems
if it excluded a Contracting Party to the GATT from the benefits of an
agreement. Article I of the GATT requires that unconditional most favored
nation status apply between Contracting Parties, and the dispute settlement
procedures of Article XXIII permit Contracting Parties to challenge actions
that violate GATT rules or "nullify or impair" benefits accruing under the
GATT. In view of these provisions, it might be difficult for a Contracting
Party to defend the use of conditional most favored nation status against
another Contracting Party. At some point, either the GATT's most fa-
vored nation principle or the nontariff codes' conditional most favored na-
tion principles will have to yield. In this sense, a rigid application of the
conditional most favored nation principle could carry seeds of the GATT's
disintegration from a broad based international trading system into a series




As final negotiations began in the fall of 1978, it was clear that the
133. By application of the most favored nation principle, text accompanying note 92 supra,
negotiated tariff reductions made by a group of Contracting Parties would be extended imme-
diately and unconditionally to all other Contracting Parties, regardless of whether those other
Contracting Parties had contributed equivalent tariff reductions of their own. The strong be-
lief in the U.S. Congress that some industrialized nations had gained such "free rides" during
the Kennedy Round led to the specification in the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2136(b)
(1976), that the President was to deny benefits of new trade agreements or withdraw conces-
sions made under past ones, with respect to any major industrialized country that he deter-
mined had not in the current negotiations provided "substantially equivalent market
opportunities" for U.S. products as those provided by the United States.
134. Generally speaking, conditional most favored nation status means that trade benefits
are extended only to the products of a specific group of countries, such as those willing to
undertake the obligations of a particular agreement. Unconditional most favored nation sta-
tus would be the extension of any benefit to products of all countries, without qualification.
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most ambitious trade negotiation in history had come a long way in the five
years since the Tokyo Declaration; but it was equally clear that many of the
most difficult obstacles lay ahead. If the MTN was to meet its December
15 target date, negotiators would have only sixty days to reconcile widely
differing positions on issues such as domestic subsidies affecting trade, se-
lective temporary safeguards, commodity agreements and market access for
agricultural products, overall tariff balance, and a host of more technical
questions in each of the areas under negotiation.
To add to the pressure, failure to reach agreement by December 15
might jeopardize the entire effort. The U.S. Treasury's temporary statutory
authority to waive the imposition of countervailing duties on certain subsi-
dized imports was to expire on January 3, 1979, immediately subjecting to
countervailing duties seventeen products that have benefited from such
waivers. Imposition of these countervailing duties could have a devastating
effect upon incomplete negotiations concerning subsidies and counter-
vailing duties, and agricultural trade. This is particularly true because the
Treasury imposed several of the waived duties on products subsidized by
the Common Market's Common Agricultural Policy programs. Even if the
negotiations were completed on time and the Common Agricultural Policy
questions were resolved in such a way as to reverse these U.S. complaints
against EEC products, the results could not be implemented for several
months. At this writing, the effect of the expiration of the waiver authority
on the MTN is still unclear.
Lack of congressional support could render the entire MTN effort fu-
tile even if the negotiations conclude on schedule and the issue of the coun-
tervailing duty waiver can be solved. Both the Senate and the House of
Representatives must approve all nontariff agreements and must in most
cases enact implementing legislation for the agreements. It would be diffi-
cult to rely on congressional support for the MTN in a time of record U.S.
trade deficits and allegations of unfair foreign trade practices. There have
been specific unfavorable omens on Capitol Hill. In its waning hours, the
95th Congress passed a rider prohibiting U.S. tariff reductions on textile
products, which threatened to set back the MTN by causing other countries
to withdraw their offers.
Finally, U.S. policymakers and negotiators have been trying so fever-
ishly to complete the Tokyo Round that they have given little thought to its
implications, both for the GATT system and for U.S. trade policy. Adop-
tion of the nontariff codes on a conditional most favored nation basis could
considerably reduce the "multilateralization" of trade issues inherent in the
GATT system by creating several small rules systems with different mem-
berships. Moreover, neither the GATT organization nor the U.S. trade
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policy structure is currently equipped to manage the sharply increased ad-
ministrative burdens that will result from adoption of the nontariff codes.
In fact, the conclusion of the Tokyo Round may be the occasion for needed
improvements in both of these areas. Despite all of these difficulties, the
potential consequences of failure in the Tokyo Round are so great that, in
the words of ECC Vice President Wilhelm Haferkamp, the negotiations
seem "condemned to succeed." 135
EPILOGUE
The Tokyo Round did not formally conclude on December 15, but as
1978 drew to a close there was no longer much doubt among the major
participants that agreements covering the subjects discussed in this Article
would be reached early in 1979. Progress on all fronts had enabled the
United States to reach bilateral understandings, effectively concluding its
negotiations with Japan, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Austria, and
had permitted virtually complete texts of almost all nontariff subjects, sup-
ported by several key delegations, to be produced. President Carter was
preparing to notify formally Congress and the public at the beginning of
January of his intention to enter into trade agreements in approximately
ninety days. Only the details of a balanced tariff agreement, some relatively
minor technical matters, and more significant political problems relating to
timing still separated the United States and the EEC. Although some diffi-
cult points remained, the prospects for successfully concluding the negotia-
tions within a matter of weeks had never looked better.
One problem that would occupy the coming weeks was the need to
broaden the base of agreements to include developing countries, most of
which still maintained a skeptical distance. It was generally felt that if less
developed countries did not join the agreements prior to the convening of
UNCTAD V in May 1979, their participation in the MTN would be
delayed and endangered.
Perhaps the most delicate set of remaining issues revolved around
three aspects of U.S. domestic political processes. First, the expiration on
January 3 of the Secretary of the Treasury's authority to waive counter-
vailing duties meant that several European exports benefiting from restitu-
tion payments under the politically sensitive Common Agricultural Policy
faced possible penalty duties at U.S. ports. After an initial standoff in
which the EEC refused to conclude an agreement on subsidies and counter-
135. Unrecorded oral statement of Wilhelm Haferkamp, Vice President for External Rela-
tions, European Economic Community.
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vailing duties until Congress acted to restore the waiver authority, and U.S.
negotiators felt helpless to secure such action from Congress until there was
an agreement covering subsidies, the parties resumed work on a de facto
agreement that all recognized would remain tentative until the ninty-sixth
Congress lifted the threat of penalty duties on products for which the
waiver had been exercised.
By year's end such a de facto agreement existed, and the Administra-
tion was preparing to submit proposed legislation to extend the waiver au-
thority. Such a proposal could, of course, become a lightning rod that
would attract many other trade proposals, some of them possibly undesir-
able. In the meantime, the Administration expected to permit importers to
post bonds for their potential countervailing duty liabilities, so that the ac-
tual collection of penalty duties would not be necessary.
A second issue related to U.S. domestic political processes involved the
understandable unwillingness of other governments to implement domesti-
cally commitments made in the Tokyo Round until the United States also
had implemented nontariff agreements requiring domestic approval and, in
some cases, implementing legislation. Memories of good Executive branch
intentions that were not accepted by Congress extend as far back as the
League of Nations treaty. To meet this problem, many MTN participants
clearly indicated that they would not regard the negotiations as formally
concluded and that they would not implement their own nontariff agree-
ments until Congress had accepted the agreements presented to it.
Achievement of that congressional acceptance is the third U.S. domes-
tic issue. The three month period following the President's notice in early
January of the U.S. intention to sign agreements will be one of intensive
consultations with congressional committees and staffs, official private sec-
tor advisors, and other segments of the public about the acceptability of the
agreements, the legislation that will be needed to implement them, and
other changes in U.S. trade laws or institutions that may be needed. It is
likely that these consultations will spark a full scale review, and ultimately
a reformulation, of U.S. international trade laws. The task of the Adminis-
tration during this period will be to win acceptance of the agreements, to
gain domestic implementation of them in a manner that reasonably carries
out their intent, and to direct the reformulation of basic trade legislation
that is almost certain to occur.
Even the most widespread and complete acceptance of the Tokyo
Round results in the United States and elsewhere will only begin, rather
than end, evaluations of the negotiations' ultimate worth. It will take time
for new rules and procedures to be tested in operation, both internationally
and within member countries. The probable results of the Tokyo
Round-a political gesture of support for open trade, somewhat smoother
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procedures for handling international trade disputes, modernization and
clarification of the framework of trading rules-are fundamentally impor-
tant but not dramatic. The risk of the Tokyo Round's failure would be
dramatic indeed in terms of shrinking international trade and national
economies through a public failure of the will to resist economic national-
ism. But fortunately, at the close of 1978, this risk appeared to be diminish-
ing.
